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Introduction
In answering a question of what the Tokyo Trial was, Professor Kentaro 
Awaya, a leading historian of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East, has argued, “The Tokyo Trial refers to multi-factorial 
histories. And, it is also certainly a contemporary subject, reminding 
us of unsettled problems of war and peace.”1  He said so rightly.  The 
historical outcome of the Tokyo Trial was neither established only by 
a single factor, like American politics, nor convincing of its legitimacy 
every of us who has lived in the post-war period.  
This view can be best learned from a study on why the Emperor 
Hirohito was not prosecuted in the tribunal.  It is well known that the 
post-war disposal of the Japanese Emperor was “the biggest issue” about 
which the Allied Countries and Japan argued throughout the process of 
the Tribunal.2  And, the United States consequently decided to keep 
the Japanese imperial family for its occupational policy, by exempting 
Hirohito from judgment.  Regarding this historical fact, historical 
researchers agree that Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers, played a crucial role in making the decision.  In 
short, the United States granted immunity to Hirohito for the political 
reason.
However, it has come known gradually that it was not so America-
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centric as it were.  Past historians overlooked a broad range of public 
discussion around Japan as to the Emperor’s war responsibility, because 
of their emphasis on international power politics behind the Trial.  Also, 
they tended to consider post-war Japanese authorities as a whole to be 
sympathetic to defendants. This historiography, however, results in 
misunderstanding the crux of Japanese government’s logic.  Japan’s 
government largely shared the idea with the defenders but, it is also 
true, the government held similar opinion about the post-war disposal of 
Hirohito to MacArthur’s.  
Thus, this paper firstly explores the actual process where the Allied 
Countries reached a decision by examining what strategy Japan deployed 
in defending its head of state from prosecution.  In other words, it studies 
how Japan contributed to the immunity given to the Emperor.  Particular 
attention is paid to the logic of the Japanese government, its defending 
activities and the activity of Ichiro Kiyose, a defense lawyer at the Trial.
Another important point to be considered is the relationship between 
the Emperor Hirohito and MacArthur which is most illuminated in 
Emperor’s words at the “Hirohito-MacArthur” meeting.  It has been said 
that the imperial message was a crucial factor in leading MacArthur to 
exempt Hirohito from the responsibility for the war.  In 2008, however, 
Professor Narahiko Toyoshita has discovered that Hirohito’s message 
announced for the public in the 1940s had a missing part that suggests 
us a way to rethink of the Emperor Hirohito.3  Referring to this study, 
I argue about what the post-war disposal of Hirohito has reminded us.  
1.　Japan’s Reaction to the Coming Military Tribunal
This chapter surveys how Japan understood the war trial and made 
counter actions to it before its opening.  In approaching this question, it 
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shows that Japanese government had studied the international military 
court before the defeat, but it failed to understand what it meant in the 
western context.  Precisely to say, Japan expected its wartime leaders 
to be prosecuted for crimes, but lacked enough knowledge on “the war 
crime” that would be applied.  In so doing, it had a particular interest 
in this study.  It lies in a question whether the Emperor Hirohito would 
be called by the bar, or not, and how to prevent him from punishment.
Precedents for Prosecuting the Head of State
In the wartime, Japan’s authorities were fully aware of political risks 
arising from the defeat.  Before the Potsdam Declaration, whose Clause 
10 stipulates that the Allies punish all the war criminals including those 
who have abused its prisoners, Japan’s government had known of the 
coming international tribunal for war criminals through its diplomats. 
Hence, it started preparation for the Tokyo Trial in wartime.  Ichiro 
Kiyose, a defender at the Tokyo Trial, later recollected:
In the later stage of the war, [Japanese authorities informally] 
entrusted a study of international laws to the legal consultants 
to the Army, suggested by Fumio Ohyama, lieutenant general 
in law of the Army.  They were Junpei Shinobu, ex-lecturer in 
international laws at the Naval Academy, Kousaku Tamura, a 
distinguished historian of diplomacy, and me (Ichiro Kiyose). 
We met at an official residence of the Deputy Secretary for the 
War once a week in order to study the international treaties that 
had terminated the past war since the Westphalia Treaty, and in 
particular, we paid close attention to the Versailles Treaty after 
the Great War.4  [translated and supplemented by the author]
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This can be considered as a preliminary study for the coming military 
trials in a context that Japan was going to lose the war.  Hence, Kiyose 
possibly focused on the Versailles Treaty.  He, however, never explained 
why he and his colleagues had such a meeting under the control of the 
Army.  It was supposedly held behind the public.
It is inevitable that Japan studied the Versailles Treaty that spells out 
the punitive measures given to post-war Germany and its Kaisar, the head 
of the state.  German experience threatened Japan whose constitution 
was centred on its royal family.  For contemporary specialists in 
international laws, too, the Versailles’ clause for Kaisar was controversial. 
Kisaburo Yokota, a jurist of international laws, wrote that it was a new 
phenomenon in history to prosecute the Kaisar, the head of state, for the 
war itself.5  Hence, Kiyose certainly investigated “the Kaisar Clause”, 
unless he intentionally missed it.  Kiyose, however, did not explain what 
a specific view they reached in the research.  Nor did he mention the 
clauses for prosecuting “the Kaiser”（Clauses227-230）which provide 
that the German Kaisar Wilhelim the Second be prosecuted for his 
disregarding the international treaties and committing to crime against 
international morality.  Kiyose’s memoir leaves unknown what opinion 
the Kiyose’s team had about the precedent for prosecuting the head of 
state.6  It is least certain that Japan faced another international tribunal 
after the Versailles.  While having been a victor in 1919, Japan was on 
the losing side in 1945.7
The Post-war Japanese Government and Tokyo Trial
On 2 September 1945, the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East was inaugurated according to Japan’s agreement to the Potsdam 
Declaration, an instrument of surrender, on the battleship Missouri. 
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This event made Japanese government to seriously consider a question: 
what “the war criminal” actually referred to.  To this question, Kiyose 
answered:
It is necessary to obey the clause [of the Potsdam Declaration] 
that “war criminals”, such as those who committed to ill-
treatment of prisoners, be inflicted a severe punishment. 
However, it is difficult to understand the phrase “war criminals” 
except abusing prisoners.8  [translated by the author]
Like Kiyose, Japan’s government sought most to know the meaning 
of “war criminals.”  In its earlier studies on the military tribunal, 
Sigeharu Enomoto wrote a paper titled “an issue of the officials who 
were responsible for commencing the war” (“Kaisen ni kansuru sensou 
sekinin-sha no mondai”)  In this, he offers a pessimistic prospect for the 
treatment of the Emperor Hirohito. 
As Japan virtually antagonized the whole world in the last 
war, which made the war characterised as punishment rather 
than simply a battle, we face a difficulty with legitimizing the 
war. … Thus, we have to contend against the Allied Countries, 
it is regrettable, for the responsibility for opening hostilities. 
However, it is also crucial to plead innocence of His Majesty the 
Emperor and regarding this issue, I hope you read my private 
memorandum “the responsibility for the exercise the imperial 
prerogative.” (Taiken sikou ni kansuru sekinin)9[translated by 
the author]
In addition to Enomoto’s study, the Emperor’s responsibility was 
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mentioned in another government’s study titled “the study on the 
Emperor’s responsibility for the war” （Tennou no sensou sekinin ni 
kansuru kenkyu）:
1.  Principle
The problem is about the His Majesty the Emperor Hirohito. 
Hence, this study aims to argue about the responsibility for the 
war, based on the precise facts; even slight misrepresentation 
seems an irreparable mistake in the thinking of Anglo-
American laws that would definitely respond; some Japanese 
subjects would conceal the truth for the fear that he might be 
punished; although arising from loyalty, it may result in a great 
mistake, for the reason I have mentioned above.  Above all, it 
seems possible to prove how the Emperor had a sacred thought, 
hoping peace and disliking warfare at heart, if we bring it to 
light and avoid misunderstanding.10 [translated by the author]
Following this fundamental direction, the study explains its specific 
focus:
Accepting the Potsdam Declaration, Japan admits its diplomatic 
policies to have wrongly caused warfare.  Therefore, we have 
to study the Emperor’s responsibilities for the war.  In short, 
it shall not defend itself but investigates its own fault in the 
past politics, and it had better demonstrate that the Army or 
government were responsible for waging the war, and thus 
how the reason why the Emperor should not be involved in the 
tribunal.  In other words, our point is to criticize government’s 
policy and censure the Army for its maneuvers.11 [translated by 
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the author]
This study tells us that admitting its responsibility for the war after the 
Potsdam, Japan’s government paid attention to the questions: whether 
the Emperor was included in war criminals, and how it could avoid the 
prosecution of the Emperor Hirohito.  For these purposes, it did not 
hesitate to shift the blame for the war onto the wartime government and 
Army.  This opinion differed from the defenders like Kiyose.
It is in this context that on 15 November 1945, the Shidehara Cabinet 
seconded a question as to “war responsibility,” which shows:
Clause 1 General Directions
…
（2）His Majesty the Emperor prays for a peaceful settlement 
with the United States. 
（3）His Majesty the Emperor could not reject the policies on 
commencing the war and military operations decided by the 
wartime government and Imperial General Headquarters, 
according to the custom（Kanrei）stipulated in the 
constitutional law.
Clause 2 Specific Directions
Explanation about His Majesty the Emperor.
（1）His Majesty the Emperor persistently wished the government 
to make a peaceful agreement with the United States 
throughout the war.  
（2）His Majesty the Emperor could not reject the policies on 
commencing the war and military operations decided by the 
wartime government and General Staff Office, according 
to the custom stipulated in the constitutional law.  
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（3）His Majesty the Emperor was reported the earlier general 
plan by the Chief of the Navy before the Attack on 
Pearl Harbor, but not informed of the specific military 
operation.12 [translated by the author]
   
In short, Japanese government insisted that the Emperor was not 
responsible for the war, for the most reason that he had wished peace 
and, as a constitutional monarch, persistently obeyed the constitutional 
law.  In making this decision, the Shidehara Cabinet possibly considered 
the above-mentioned preliminary studies on war responsibility.
Despite the fact that the post-war government tried to establish 
a view on the war responsibility of the Emperor by making a cabinet 
decision, it failed to wipe away a public feeling that the Allied Countries 
would prosecute the Emperor.  This was framed a political trend that 
international leaders and journalism clamored for the prosecution of 
Japan’s emperor.  Even some of Japanese did so.13
While the Japanese government sought immunity for the Emperor, 
the General Headquarter of the Allied Countries had started arresting 
suspects.  On 11 September, it issued the first 39 arrest warrants for 
those who include Hideki Tojo, the Prime Minister at the opening of 
the war.  In December, it arrested additional suspects that ranged from 
Emperor’s staff and senior politicians, like Koichi Kido, the Inner 
Minister, Fumimaro Konoe, the late Prime Minister, to such members of 
the Imperial family as Nasimotonomiya Morimasa-ou, the Marshal of 
the Army.  To this end, it detained 103 Japanese servicemen, politicians, 
bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, for war crimes at Sugamo Prison.14
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2. How did Hirohito Survive the Tokyo Trial? 
This paper has explored Japan’s counteraction against the international 
military tribunal in and after the war, specifically how Japan concentrated 
on an issue of prosecution of the Emperor.  This section argues about 
another question embedded in the post-war disposal of Hirohito.  It 
is why MacArthur decided not to prosecute Hirohito.  Preliminary to 
answering this question, this paper examines how decisively MacArthur 
played a role in making the decision of not prosecuting Hirohito.
The powerful initiative of MacArthur arose from political contexts. 
The Allied Countries, it is well known, were divided in their opinions 
about the war disposal of the Japanese Emperor and the Emperor 
system of Japan.  In the United States, too the Department of State 
was split into two factions; one sought abolition of the system, another 
demanding its preservation.15  Hence, US authorities had a difficulty in 
making a decision.  It was the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 
（SWNCC）that made a breakthrough to muddle.  It entrusted the 
issue to MacArthur.  On its 28th meeting, it adopted a resolution that 
MacArthur confidentially investigate, and report to the committee, 
whether the Emperor Hirohito was responsible for the war and thereby 
should be prosecuted（SWNCC 5 5-6）.16   
The Emperor Hirohito and General MacArthur 
Assigned by the SWNCC, Douglas MacArthur had eleven meetings 
with Hirohito since 27 September 1945.  Regarding these meetings, 
Professor Narahiko Toyoshita points out that the first meeting was the 
most significant in the arrangement for the immunity granted to the 
Emperor.17
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At a crossroad meeting, it is said, the Emperor Hirohito expressed 
that “I come to you, General MacArthut, to offer myself to the judgment 
of the powers you represent as the one to bear sole responsibility for every 
political and military decision made and action taken by my people in the 
conduct of war.”18  This imperial message was delivered by newspapers, 
and moved Japanese public.  It also impressed MacArthur himself, and 
almost impelled him to support him.  This legendary anecdote is printed 
in MacArthur’s autobiography, and still gives us a touching story about 
the imperial words of Hirohito（unless it was constructed）.
The legend drawn from Emperor’s words, however, conceals an 
important story for its strategic purpose, by combining a bit of truth with 
a psychological leading.  It was the Emperor’s criticism over Hideki 
Tojo.  Professor Toyoshita reveals another word of the Emperor’s 
that Tojo did not follow the Imperial Rescript on waging the war in 
the way that the Emperor himself had wished.  From this, Toyoshita 
infers that the Emperor attributed the war responsibility to Tojo at the 
meeting with MacArthur.19  This view has been criticized by those who 
strongly believe that the Emperor does never comment on individuals. 
And, Toyoshita was also said to argue with a circumstantial evidence. 
However, the Matsui Paper supports Toyoshita’s view.
It is not straightforward to understand Hirohito’s censure on Tojo, 
since it was largely known through a variety of historical documents 
that the Emperor preferred Tojo who was loyal to the Empire.  Hence, 
it is wondered that Hirohito criticized Tojo despite the wartime close 
relationship.  It seems not to arise from simply a bitter complaint against 
his primary staff.  Rather, the reason is that the Emperor intended to 
answer why he had not stopped the war.  In short, he seemingly argued 
that Tojo decided commencing the war, apart from the Emperor’s true 
intention for peace.  To this end, he represented himself as a constitutional 
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monarch who could not resist the decision made by a constitutionally 
elected prime minister, but opposed to warfare.  Importantly, this logic 
permeated all the actions taken by Japan and the United States for the 
exemption of Hirohito from the war responsibility.  
As a consequence of the Hirohito-MacArthur, MacArthur inclined 
to seriously consider granting immunity for the Emperor.  He said to the 
Emperor before his leaving Japan that when the Washington authorities 
asked him whether the United States should prosecute Hirohito, he of 
course objected it.20  The Emperor replied, it is generally said, that he 
would accept MacArthur’s treatment.  This conversation may be very 
crucial in making of MacArthur’s decision, since there seems no other 
psychological determinant but Hirohito’s words.  MacArthur did not 
meet any important event but those meetings with Hirohito between 22 
October 1945, the day of SWNCC’s initial request, and 25 January 1946 
when he finally fixed the decision.
It has been so far considered what was true in the imperial words. 
Here, “psychological leading” that I mentioned above is to be examined 
closely. By “psychological leading,” it means that the imperial words 
achieved a drastic result.  In other words, only a specific phrase was 
released out of of Hirohito’s words and consequently praised, even 
although the full records has not been open to the public.  Thus, it seems 
that some chose necessary information from the meeting, and spread 
it as imperial words of the legendary Emperor.  Before thinking who 
might have done so, this paper looks into MacArthur’s response to the 
SWNCC at Washington.  
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MacArthur’s Decision
On 22 January 1946, MacArthur read a telegram from the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, which tells that at a London meeting of the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, Australian representatives submitted an original list 
of 62 Japanese suspects for war crimes, including the Emperor Hirohito.21 
As mentioned above, at that time, MacArthur had almost settled a matter 
of the Emperor’s war responsibility.  Hence, he was possibly worried 
whether other Allied Countries would follow Australia.  But MacArthur 
did not immediately bring his answer to Washington, because he had not 
yet started actual investigation into war responsibility of Hirohito’s.22 
As a consequence, he was impelled to fix his answer as soon as possible. 
On 25 January, he sent an urgent telegram to Dwight David Eisenhower, 
Chief of Staff of the United States Army.  In this message, he said that he 
did not find clear evidence that the Emperor Hirohito committed to war 
crimes, and then recommended not prosecuting the Japanese head of 
state.  Furthermore, he stated that according to his fullest investigation, 
he is surely impressed that the Emperor’s constitutional functions related 
to waging the war relied on ministers and advisories around the Emperor. 
And, he continued, if the Emperor would be prosecuted for war crimes, 
the United Stated had to change our occupation plan.  It means that it 
would be necessary for the United States to mobilize a million soldiers 
and several hundred thousand administrators for Japan’s guerilla war, 
and to establish another wartime supply system.23  Important in his 
making the message, he had not carried out any substantial investigation 
but significantly depended on his staff’s advice, which is called Feller’s 
memorandum.  
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Fellers, MacArthur, and Japan -Constructing a “Powerless Emperor”
The Feller’s memorandum is a private paper about the disposal of 
Japanese Emperor Hirohito that was written by Brigadier General Bonar 
F. Feller, a military secretary to MacArthur.24  Its famous phrase regarding 
the Emperor’s war responsibility is that the Emperor Hirohito, the head 
of state, is responsible for the Imperial Rescript for a declaration of war 
issued on 8 December 1941.  However, according to a highly credible 
source, it is proved that the war was not waged by the Emperor.  The 
Emperor had had no intention to carry out the rescript in a way which 
Tojo actually did.25	 In short, Fellers argued that the Emperor wished 
avoiding warfare, but Tojo, disregarding his wish, commenced the war 
(which is not true).  And, Fellers highly appreciated Hirohito for his 
cooperation to America’s bloodless occupation and demilitarization of 
Japanese army. On this ground, he argued that if having prosecuted the 
Japanese Emperor, the United States would have indispensably prepared 
another massive expeditionary force with more than several thousand 
administrators to suppress a national riot.  Thus, he concluded, the 
prosecution of the Emperor would prolong America’s occupation.  
In this part, he obviously aimed to lead American government to 
exempt Hirohito from indictment by emphasizing a strategic value of the 
Emperor.  As for the intention embedded in the Fellers’ memorandum, 
Professor Toyoshita convincingly explained that it consisted of denial 
of Hirohito’s war responsibility and a strategic thinking of using the 
Emperor in the occupational policy.26  As a result, Feller’s view was 
employed later in the MacArthur’s telegram.  
It, however, does not employ Feller’s insistence relating to the 
Emperor’s war responsibility, and instead emphasizes an image 
of “powerless emperor” who could not constitutionally oppose to 
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the decision made by the cabinet.  At a meeting with the SWNCC, 
MacArthur remarked that when he asked Hirohito why he had failed 
to prevent the war by his rescript, although he could have done so in 
finishing, Hirohito said that he did never wish waging war, but, even if 
he wished or other emperors had wished, could not resist the pressures 
arising from politicians and public opinion.27  Not only in this passage, 
but in other occasions MacArthur represented the Japanese Emperor as 
a constitutional monarch.  Only by spreading such innocent image of 
Hirohito, he called for immunizing him.
Along with American efforts, Japan also contributed to constructing 
“Hirohito, constitutional monarch.”  To support the above view, oral 
evidences of Hirohito were collected by courtiers of Japanese imperial 
court.  In the dictated documents, the Emperor commented on his own 
political standpoint as a constitutional monarch that “I have no choice 
but following cabinet’s decisions, even if I am not in favor of them” 
(translated by the authour).  This word was not employed in the Tokyo 
Trial, but was supposedly read by MacArthur.28  Over all, both Japan 
and the United States established an idea of “powerless emperor” for 
immunizing the Emperor.
However, the image of “powerless emperor” was a product of 
MacArthur’s misunderstanding of Emperor’s constitutional function.  In 
short, he knew of it very roughly.  This fact shows that he knew only an 
aspect of the imperial power（Tennou taiken）in Japanese constitution 
in terms of its relation to ministers of state.29  In other words, he did not 
understand Emperor’s military power stipulated by the constitutional 
law, which means that the Emperor was a commander in chief that could 
exercise a power of supreme command（Tousui-ken）.  According to 
the constitutional law, it was required the Emperor’s agreement to 
commencing the war.  
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In consideration to this, it is wondered why the Emperor could not 
make his own decision at the opening stage of the war, while having 
been able to do so in accepting the Potsdam Declaration.  To resolve 
this contradiction, I argues, the Emperor had to criticize Tojo for his 
disregarding the imperial decision-making.  In other words, those who 
depicted Hirohito as a constitutional monarch intended to exempt him 
from war responsibility, attributing it to someone else.  As an inevitable 
consequence, politicians and military figures were indicted for war 
crimes.  This imputation of war responsibility was a few strategic option 
that MacArthur could take, who had already decided not to prosecute 
the Emperor in January 1946.  At that time, he had to make a quick 
but little elaborated decision, when domestic and international public 
called for punishment of Hirohito.  Such a dilemma required legitimacy, 
which he later found was the imperial message.  And, it functioned as 
he wished.  The Emperor’s passage that he was responsible for “all the 
matters” was expected to reinforce an image of “a pathetic monarch” 
and to receive public sympathy to the maximum extent. MacArthur 
propagandized and spread it as “imperial words,” and largely achieved 
his purpose.  In other words, MacArthur manipulated the Emperor’s 
words for the purpose of “preparation” for the Tokyo Trial.  And, for 
his own purpose of obtaining the immunity, the Emperor made up his 
mind to accept political rhetoric.  It was only a way for him to survive 
the post-war politics, and to protect the Japanese court (Kokutai) that 
had a long tradition.30  Hence, the exemption of Hirohito from the Tokyo 
Tribunal was the very political product for which Japan and the United 
States cooperated with each other.  
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Conclusion
As shown above, this paper has argued that the United States exempted 
the Emperor Hirohito from war responsibilities at the Tokyo Tribunal 
for the reason that it was necessary in America’s occupation to preserve 
the Imperial system.  In the decision-making, MacArthur played a 
particularly important role.  Facing Austrialian actions for prosecuting 
the Emperor, he sent an ad hoc message to Washington that the Emperor 
should not be indicted in the coming trial.  This answer without 
much thought, however, put him into a difficulty.  He was impelled 
to legitimize the immunity granted to the Emperor.  Therefore, he 
propagandized a story of how important Hirohito was in carrying out 
American occupation.  On the other hand, to legitimize the Emperor was 
also a logical preparatory work at the Tokyo Trial.  In short, MacArthur 
needed the Emperor for its occupational policy, and the Emperor wished 
MacArthur’s help in preserving his royal family and its history.31  In 
other words, despite their difference in political intention, they pursued 
the same political line as to preserve Japanese emperor system.  A verbal 
device in the politics was the imperial message.  
As a consequence that the Emperor was not called to account for the 
war, however, we have missed a chance to clarify his war responsibilities. 
As this paper shows, “the Tokyo Trial was not necessarily victor’s 
justice.”32  Rather, it seems to be constructed much more diverse 
agencies and factors as we have expected.  The Emperor not judged was 
a shadow behind the Tokyo Trial.
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